“Nicaragua Betrayed” Summary— Chapter 7: Brick Walls — U.S. Style

by Edward Ulrich
News of Interest.TV

February 12, 2011

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Issues explained in this chapter include how by late 1977, Managua turned into a “media circus” having an insatiable appetite for ever increasing sensationalism; how a Leftist Central American committee was formed to pressure countries against Somoza; the hypocrisy of Jimmy Carter’s endorsement of Panama; Congressional testimony by U.S. Army General Gordon Sumner who accurately identified the situation in Central America at that time; increasingly hostile communication being received from the United States; issues with a subversive group called the “Famous Twelve”; and Somoza’s announcement of plans to step down after his current term.


Following are key points from the chapter:

— By late 1977, every day the city of Managua was filled with “television teams, foreign correspondents, syndicated writers, independent writers, and all manner and means of worldwide communication.”  Somoza explains that it is difficult to function in a normal way with such scrutiny and with people searching for sensationalism, but the government maintained its poise even in that circus atmosphere.  The press started to attack Somoza’s Cabinet members’ individual personal lives, and Somoza says that unfortunately he yielded to overwhelming pressure to appease and he replaced his Cabinet, but, “Out of all of this I learned a lesson.  It’s impossible to appease an insatiable appetite,” and the forces then again focused on him in particular.

— While this was happening, the “Comite de Solidaridad con el Puelo de Nicaragua” (Committee of Solidarity for the People of Nicaragua) was formed to fight Somoza and his government.  Somoza says, “On the surface, that sounds like a committee which could have been formed after the earthquake to help the people of Nicaragua.  But experience has taught me that the Left is most adept at forming noble-sounding committees to do its dirty work.”  Somoza found that the origin of this committee was Havana, Cuba, and that it was formed by Communists in Honduras.  This committee was given funds by Havana to travel to Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama.  Venezuela also formed a committee under the same name for the same purpose.  The Communists used this committee to pressure Latin American Governments to oppose Somoza.  The committee had some effect, but intelligence sources revealed that it failed in many cases, such as with Panama attempting to get Honduras to make war against Nicaragua.


— From pages 95-96:



Congressional Testimony of U.S. Army General Gordon Sumner


— Carter cannot claim ignorance about the Leftist policies of Torrijos.  Testimony of an intelligence report by a highly decorated General of the U.S. Army Gordon Sumner was delivered to members of U.S. Congress on June 7, 1979, which is reproduced in full in the book.  Passages from the report are as follows: (from pages 97-99)


— Sumner gave the above testimony to Congress over a month before the Marxist takeover in Nicaragua, and the same information was presented to General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General McAuliffe, the U.S. Commander of the Southern Command, the Defense Department, and the State Department in November, 1977.

— The testimony of Sumner pushed the Carter Administration into high gear to get the Panama Canal Treaties signed before the American people became enlightened as to who and what Torrijos was.  Also, despite such testimony, the Carter Administration never admitted that they had any proof that Torrijos was working with Castro in support of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.  “If any person is interested in all the evidence present and the testimony given in the aforementioned subcommittee, that information can be obtained from the U.S. Government Printing Office.  Simply ask for a booklet entitled ‘Panama Gunrunning: Hearings before the Subcommittee On The Panama Canal, U.S. House of Representatives, June 6, 7, and July 10, 1979, Serial No.  96-22.’”



Nicaragua Municipal Elections in 1978 Along With Disturbing Communication from the United States


— According to the Constitution of Nicaragua, on the first Sunday in February it was required to hold municipal elections throughout the country where Mayors of the cities would be elected.  Elections would be held in 130 municipalities, and the law required voter registration to occur sixty days prior to the election, so Somoza had to work hard to get people registered to vote.  Despite the deadly problems the country was facing, in the end of 1977 he was able to visit many different parts of the country to inspire people to register to vote, while those in the opposition party were urging people not to register to vote and the U.S. government was assisting in that effort.  Even so, a successful registration drive had been accomplished.

— In 1977, Nicaragua needed money for many projects and they had several important projects pending in the BID and the World Bank.  These projects had to be voted on, and the U.S. then voted openly against Nicaragua that caused the funding to not pass.  Additionally, plans and engineering studies had been completed on a much needed highway around the center of Managua, and a U.S. journalist named Jack Anderson stepped in and wrote an article criticizing U.S. assistance for funding this highway, telling readers that much of the highway would pass through property that was owned by the Somoza family and he would derive much financial benefit from it.  “His column must be the Bible for the State Department, the White House, and certain members of Congress, because U.S. assistance was canceled.”  Somoza explains the truth is that a portion of the highway did run through Somoza property that was acquired by his family twenty years or more before the earthquake, but a large majority also went through the property of other landowners.

— Somoza had a conference with U.S. ambassador Solaun where he politely explained to him the importance of the projects to Nicaragua that were under consideration, but it was like talking to a brick wall due to the State Department thoroughly briefing Solaun on what his attitude toward Somoza and his government should be.

— Preliminary studies had been completed for the large Copalar dam project that was very important to Nicaragua, and Funding was going to be received from the French, Canadians, and Brazilians, but the U.S. then stepped in and started a smear campaign through the La Presna newspaper against Somoza’s financial advisor Rodriguez Feliu, and the U.S. had the funding for the project withdrawn through intervention and pressure on the countries that were involved.

— Somoza sent mutual friends of the Ambassador to attempt to communicate with him and get a more detailed reading on the U.S. attitude toward him, and they always came back with disturbing reports such as, “These people and the United States are disposed to overthrow you.”

— Somoza says, “All my life I tried to be realistic.  That is, meet realism face to face.  In every life there is adversity, but how we face that adversity, when it does come, shows the true character of a man or woman.  With reference to the developing U.S. attitude toward me, I had to accept the situation.  It was discouraging, and I could only hope that somehow I could get through to them the fact that I was a true friend and we faced a common enemy.  I was realistic about the danger of my position, but hoped that a way could be found to improve that position.”

— Somoza’s most well known political adversary Pedro Chamorro was killed on January 10, 1978 (explained in detail in the next chapter).  Leaders of the Conservative party wanted to postpone the municipal elections because the political climate of the country was unstable as a result, but constitutionally it was impossible to do so; thus the Conservative party used the event of his death to try to bypass the Constitution of the country.  “I broke my back to maintain the Constitution and our constitutional form of government in Nicaragua.  This is our guarantee of justice in our country.”  ...  “Whenever a political situation to a problem was proposed and that proposal violated the Constitution, my answer was always an an emphatic ‘no.’  It was widely accepted, in both parties, that I adhered strictly to the Constitution.  This is another thing that makes it difficult for me to understand the Anti-Somoza attitude that developed in Washington.”

— “On February 8, 1978, we held the municipal elections throughout Nicaragua.  It was an overwhelming victory for the Liberal party.  In an open election, we won in every municipality in Nicaragua.”

— After the elections in 1978, Somoza had a meeting with the U.S. Ambassador Solaun where Somoza was told, “You know, there are some countries who want to overthrow you,” and Somoza asked, “What will it take to get them off my back?”  He replied, “I think if you shorten your term in office, you will get them off your back.”  Somoza says he looked at him in astonishment and said, “Are you trying to say I should resign?”  His answer was a simple “yes.”



The “Famous Twelve” Episode


— Somoza says in retrospect he thinks he worked too hard to appease the U.S., thinking it would finally see the light, and this applied to his handing of a situation known as the “Famous Twelve” episode, being twelve men in Managua of business, political, and religious backgrounds who suddenly began opposing Somoza openly in the middle of 1978.  The men were preaching subversion, and the international press was constantly referring to them as “solid citizens” and “leading businessmen of Nicaragua,” when in truth they were actually Sandinistas.  “We had intelligence information on all of them and we knew of their activities.  To the press, however, they were knights in shining armor.”

— After these twelve made some subversive pronouncements, they suspected they might be arrested and incarcerated so they took refuge in Costa Rica.  From that safe haven they stepped up their attacks against Somoza through leaflets, the press, and other means.  They went too far though, and wrote and signed a manifesto in which they called for an armed uprising against Somoza and the constitutionally elected government— which was treason, so Nicaragua took legal action against the men and they were “enjoined,” which means that if they returned to Nicaragua they would be arrested and tried for treason.  This legal action caused a furor in the U.S. Embassy in Nicaragua who immediately came to the defense of the men, and Alan Riding of the New York Times took up the cause of the men and wrote highly critical articles about the action Nicaragua had taken.

— Somoza accounts, “If the Nicaraguan government had suddenly issued an order to arrest all Americans in Nicaragua, I don’t think the U.S. Embassy would have been more irritated.”  Ambassador Solaun applied as much pressure as possible to get the legal order lifted.  Because of the constant pressure of the U.S. Embassy, the government of Nicaragua then issued an announcement to the effect that since the subversive statements were made outside the country, that no crime had been committed and they could therefore return.  When they did return, a lot of money was spend to get a large airport crowd to welcome these “Famous Twelve” back, and government security people at the airport estimated that 5,000 people turned out to greet them, however journalists such as Alan Riding claimed the crowd to be 100,000 people.

— These twelve men then went on a tour of Nicaragua making subversive speeches advocating violent overthrow of the government, which was preparing the country for a revolution.  This activity brought no response from the U.S. Embassy, and Somoza knew if any of the “Famous Twelve” were harassed in any way that the Embassy would have come down on Nicaragua in full force.  “As a favor to the United States, we allowed these men to return.  Had we stood firm against U.S. pressure, we would have been better off.”



Somoza Announces That He Will Step Down After His Term


— In early February 1978, Somoza had a meeting with U.S. ambassador Solaun, and Somoza asked him what it would take to satisfy the United States.  Somoza was told that the U.S. might be satisfied if he announced that he would get out of politics in 1981, and resign from the Army.  Somoza explains his concern was for the people of Nicaragua, being concerned that the country would otherwise be overthrown by a Communist regime, so he told the Ambassador that he would make such a public declaration announcing that he would step down once his term was complete.

From page 107:




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